Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020

Container and VM Visualization for Rapid Incident Response
Dr. Jordan Shropshire
Information Systems Department
University of South Alabama
jshropshire@southalabama.edu

Abstract
Most cloud security incidents are initially detected
by automated monitoring tools. Because they are tuned
to minimize the risk of false-negative errors, these tools
cast a wide net of suspicion. Depending on the scale of
the incident, the automated tools may implicate rather
long lists of VMs and containers. Hence, this study
proposes a new intermediate step aimed at reducing
the number of VMs and containers awaiting forensic
investigation.
The proposed method renders two-dimensional
visualizations of container contents and virtual
machine disk images. The visualizations can be used to
fingerprint container / VM contents, pinpoint instances
of embedded malware, and find modified code. The
proof of concept is evaluated in a pilot study. The
results indicate that it shows promise. Implications and
future research directions are also described.
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every implicated asset. This is often costly and timeconsuming. They may even be forced to ask clients
resolve the security issues on their own (see Figure 1).

1. Introduction
Containers and virtual machines are the building
blocks of cloud computer systems. They host the
applications and data which collectively provide
scalable, on-demand services to users on a global basis.
The integrity of containers and virtual machines (VM)
is paramount. If the containers and VMs providing a
service are not trustworthy, then the cloud is irrelevant.
Because of their pivotal role in cloud computing,
containers and VMs are frequently targeted for attack
[1]. Attackers may attempt an infiltration in order to
steal or corrupt data, install rootkits, or deploy
malware. If successful, they can use the container as a
springboard for data exfiltration, disrupting hosted
services, or launching attacks against other cloud
resources [2].
A large number of VMs, containers, and other
resources could be implicated in a cloud security event.
Automated monitoring systems cast a wide net when it
comes to identifying assets which could be involved in
an incident. Cloud operations team often end up
placing long lists of VMs and containers in quarantine
until they can be cleared [3]. The cloud hosting
provider has to perform a forensic investigation on
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Figure 1. Limits of public cloud forensics
Neither solution is desirable. Cloud clients may not
have the ability to perform their own investigation.
Furthermore, cloud client still have to pay for hosting
but do not enjoy the full use of their quarantined VMs
and containers.
Hence, this research proposes a new intermediate
step between automated analysis and digital forensic
investigation. This step would allow cloud operations
teams to perform rapid analysis and adjudication of
VMs and containers. This would reduce the number of
assets which require forensic analysis.
The proposed new step introduces a new method
for out-of-band investigation of containers and VMs.
Out-of-band inspection is the process of collecting data
from outside of the element being investigated. This
reduces the possibility of perturbations of potential
evidence. It uses a novel approach for directly
accessing the container file or VM disk image and
interpreting the contents.
The proposed method renders two-dimensional,
colorized visualizations of the bytes contained in the
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Figure 2. Visualizing container files and VM disks
VM disk or container file. Bytes are read from file
and passed through a one-way privacy preserving hash
and then assigned an ASCII color based on byte value.
They are then transposed onto a PNG file of fixed
width and variable length (Figure 2, below). The
resulting visualization is intended to be interpreted by
members of the operations teams. It provides insights
into the contents of containers and VMs.
The proposed step is designed to provide a rapid
response to cloud-based incidents. With modest
classification thresholds, it could reduce the number of
assets requiring forensic analysis. This would reduce
operational costs and increase customer satisfaction.
A proof-of-concept test of the proposed new step is
evaluated. The results indicated that it shows promise
and merits additional development.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as
follows: the next section contains the background. It
describes existing methods for forensically analyzing
containers and virtual machines and introduces the
basics of visualization. The conceptual development
section follows the background. It describes the
proposed method and the expected benefits. The
process of testing and comparison described in the
evaluation section. The results of the tests are
described next. Implications and future research are
then discussed. Finally, concluding comments are
shared.

2. Background
This section provides background information on
three topics. First, it reviews existing methods for
forensically analyzing containers and virtual machines.

Second, it surveys current visualization techniques.
Third, it reviews related research.

2.1. Container and VM forensics
Both containers and virtual machines provide a
means for software isolation, and are an essential
components of any cloud based-environment. With
containers, the abstraction is performed at the
operating system level [4]. Multiple containers can
share a single host operating system. Each container
has one or more applications and their associated
libraries, configuration files, and subdirectory
structures [5]. One of the most common container
platforms is Docker. Containers have the benefit of
being lightweight. They typically provide efficiencies
over and above their VM counterparts.
For their part, VMs offer more isolation, greater
security, and cross-platform functionality [6]. They
make use of hardware-level abstraction. Each VM
includes a complete operating system, software, and
host applications. Because they replicate the operating
system, they are more costly in terms of performance.
Although containers and VMs differ in a number of
respects, at a fundamental level they both provide a
means for isolating and maintaining software that
someone else may own [7]. In this sense, the methods
of their forensic analysis tend to overlap. Some of the
approaches to accessing and investigating a container
are also used on virtual machines [6]. This is most
evident in legally-motivated investigations.
Digital forensics were historically driven by the
need to support judicial proceedings. A high degree of
importance was placed on following process,
maintaining a chain of custody, etc. [8]. However,
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current analyses may also be aimed at informing interorganizational processes and workflows. Here the
emphasis is on getting enough information to support
internal decision making while not violating terms of
service. Hence, there are two approaches to container
and VM forensics: the first is herein referred to as the
legal approach while the second will be called the
introspective approach because it uses interrogative
techniques.
The legal approach is a formalized process which
involves creating demonstrable links between points of
interest without modifying the original data. The
purpose is to provide evidence which conforms to the
practices and standards of a respective legal system [9].
This can involve several different issues, which were
partially discussed in O’Shaughnessy and Keane [10],
whose discussions dealt with data collection within a
cloud environment. Two key issues covered were the
chain of custody and multi-jurisdictional-legislation.
Chain of custody concerns with who had access to data
that will be used as evidence; given a given cloud can
span multiple geographical locations and be collocated
with other user’s data on a rack of servers, legally
obtaining the data, without crossing other users’ rights
can be challenging. This is even more complicated
when geographical location crosses jurisdictions
Once that issue is resolved and the raw files are
collected and duplicates are obtained, the forensic
investigator can proceed at a pace which allows for
appropriate diligence and care. The investigator begins
by importing a toolset which allows for brute force
password cracking [11]. After access is obtained, the
file and directory structure is reconstructed onto the
desktop of the workstation. The files and data of
interest are then gleaned.
This time-tested approach is reliable. It provides a
high degree of accuracy in file classification and
anomaly detection [12]. However, it is not particularly
time-sensitive. This approach is generally performed
post-hoc. However, it is not fast enough for real-time
operations. Too much time is lost in gaining access to
the container or VM. During a cyber event, the
operations team needs information as quickly as
possible.
The introspective approach consists of a family of
techniques which uses introspection in order to gain
insights into the processes being executed within [13].
Although this approach was originally developed for
virtual machines, parallel techniques and tools can be
used within the container space as well [4].
Introspection techniques monitor the runtime processes
and applications currently running in a virtual machine
or container. They give visibility into the software
being executed [14]. Introspection has been used in the

past to fingerprint the software running on a container
or virtual machine [6].
Introspection can be achieved via a few different
means. Dykstra and Sherman [15] developed FROST,
which is a set of tools that operated upon OpenStack, a
cloud operating system [16]. FROST permits users to
retrieve an copy of virtual disks associated with that
user’s virtual machines; it also checked API requests
and OpenStack firewall logs. One drawback is the tools
are built on-top of OpenStack and integrated into the
Horizon web-based user interface for OpenStack;
hence the stack was directly tied to OpenStack.
Another OpenStack-based approach was proposed
by Saibharah and Greethaukumari [17] who used
existing tools already available within the platform.
They built a framework based off of snapshots of both
random-access memory and disk images, as well as
working through logging systems native to OpenStack.
Finally, the researchers extended their framework to
incorporate network forensics. The evaluations showed
that evidence could be obtained for several different
types of attacks on a cloud environment.
Graziano et al. [18], unlike the previous two
studies, assumed that the forensics teams did not know
what hypervisor was being used.
Hence, they
exploited physical memory dumps of a given machine
to identify (a) if a hypervisor is present and (b), if
present, what type of hypervisor was being used. The
concept was based upon the idea that hypervisors
virtualization of memory changed how that memory is
allocated.
Casalicchio and Percibali [19] focused specifically
on analyzing containers. They wanted to determine if a
battery of tools, that collected CPU and Disk I/O
workloads, captured the same information. They
determined different tools present similar but not
completely equivalent results. Rather than compare
tools, Watts et al. [20] examined whether Prometheus
[21], an open-source introspection tool, using default
metric collection, could be used to determine if a
container was infected or not during an investigation.
The results indicated it could be, but the authors noted
an automated solution, versus manual inspection,
would be desirable.
One drawback of the previous efforts was the
concept the assumption that the underlying system was
sound; that is, that no tampering or inconsistent
information had been introduced. Thrope et al. [22]
did not make this assumption, rather, they built a
virtual machine profiler model and a log auditor to
detect and report errors and inconsistencies within the
logs; the assumption is attackers could introduce
deletions and modifications to the logs. Results
indicated that the system could find inconsistencies
within the log, indicating that they had been modified.
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Shropshire [23] approached the problem of
detecting anomalous behavior within a compromised
cloud system from a hardware prospective.
PowerCheck was developed, which identified
discrepancies by comparing the system state
parameters with parameters based upon server energy
consumption. Tests validated the idea of secondary
system measures as legitimate integrity monitors.
Unlike the previous studies. Stelly et al. [24]
focused on demonstrating the scalability of forensic
analysis of containers. They developed a toolkit
entitled SCARF toolkit that was shown to obtain high
throughput in processing when tested upon two
different clusters running containers.

2.2. Visualization techniques
The field of visualization encompasses a number of
techniques for interpreting data. These techniques
range in complexity from simple bar charts and line
graphs to x-y plots. Even more sophisticated
techniques may be used if the data structures and
relationships are highly complex. Visualizations can be
classified along three dimensions: the data to be
visualized, the visualization technique, and the
interaction technique [25, 26].
Visualizations may be based on one-dimensional
data, two-dimensional data, multi-dimensional data,
text or hypertext, graph or relational data, hierarchical
data, or audio/visual signals [27]. In general, one
dimensional data are typically represented using
histograms or visualization similar to pie charts. Two
dimensional data may be visualized with scatter plots
and line graphs. Multi-dimensional data is often
associated with icon, dense-pixel, and geometric
transformations. Regardless of data type, some
preprocessing is usually performed in order to identify
complexities such as missing elements, trends,
conversions, and skewing tendencies. Following
normalization, the most appropriate visualization
technique is selected.

2.3. Related Research
Several studies have used the concept of
visualization for security, performance, and integrity
monitoring.
Perrig and colleagues developed a method for hash
visualization [28]. The visualizations were designed to
be used instead of authentication tokens or strings. It
was theorized that humans are better equipped to
compare images than identify differences in long
alphanumeric key strings.
A study by Lee et. al. [29] investigated malicious
codes using visual pattern analysis. In this study, a

number of malicious software packages were
visualized so that pattern matching algorithms could
detect repeated features. This study laid the
groundwork for a number of follow-up studies in
malware analysis.
A study conducted by Nataraj et. al. [30] examined
the usefulness of analyzing software binaries as
images, with the goal of automatically determining
which binaries were malware. In that study, binaries
were converted into grey-scale images. Image
processing techniques were used to extract texture
information, which was then feed into a classifier,
which would then determine if the binary was safe or
malicious. Various studies expanded upon the
classification of images of software by showing
texture-based classification was faster than dynamic
analysis [31], creating noise-tolerate features from
images [32], and finally by creating a full-fledge
system based on content-based search [33]. However,
all these approaches are based on file-level analysis.
A project conducted by Jain et. al. [34] created a
visual image of Android binaries in order to study the
effect of optimization and obfuscation techniques; the
latter is often used to hide the fact that malicious code
has been developed. The inspection was done
manually, and has aided by the fact Android binaries
are generally structured; hence, color coding
techniques based on the structure were utilized to
improve understanding. This work was expanded to
include predicting what type of obfuscation was being
used; accuracy of nearly 90% were achieved [35].
A number of visualizations techniques have been
used for network forensics and security [36]. Directed
and undirected graphics, radials, and hub-and-spoke
networks can be constructed from packet flows to
support easier interpretation among human analysts.
Additionally, new generations of network visualization
incorporate clustering and random walks.

3. Conceptual Development
Most cloud security incidents are initially detected
by automated monitoring tools. Because they are
generally tuned to minimize the risk of false-negative
errors, these tools cast a wide net of suspicion.
Depending on the scale of the incident, the automated
tools may implicate rather long lists of VMs and
containers. Typically, these assets have to wait in
quarantine until they can be forensically investigated
and cleared. This could anger clients and increase
operational costs for the cloud service provider.
Hence, this study proposes a new intermediate step
aimed at reducing the number of VMs and containers
awaiting investigation. The proposed method uses
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visualization techniques to quickly interpret the
contents of VMs and containers and clear assets which
are unrelated to the incident.
The proposed new method is out-of-band, meaning
it is undetectable to the container or VM being
investigated. The container or VM is inspected from a
peering point within the hypervisor or container
engine. Furthermore, there is no impact on container
performance.
The proposed new method is designed to balance
speed with reliability. Further, it does not rely on brute
force password cracking. Additionally, it is highly
interactive. An investigator can manipulate the
visualization associated with the proposed method in
order to make rapid inferences.
The visualization methods support investigation of
the functionality of software housed in containers and
virtual machines. It enables the investigator to
fingerprint the contents of a container, identify
anomalous software, and detect content or media
which might be illegal.
The workflow is as follows: when suspicious
activity is reported or detected within the cloud,
monitoring software traces the activity over the

network back to a subset of potential offenders. These
containers or virtual machines may fall within the same
subnet, broadcast domain, or reside in the same
physical host or data center.
Each suspicious container or VM is traced from its
host back to the location where its container file or VM
disk image is permanently stored. Here the proposed
visualization techniques would be used to create a
PNG image file for each file or disk image. The PNG
image contains a two dimensional visualization of the
raw contents of the container file or VM disk.
Once the visualizations are collected, members of
the operations team perform inspections in order to
identify their software contents. The team then looks
for anomalous modifications, rootkits, other instances
of malware, and illicit content. With little training it is
possible to make meaningful inferences from the
visualizations. For instance, contrasting visualizations
of the same container over time will yield a timeordering of changes in its contents (See Figure 3).
Assets which are clearly not part of an ongoing
cyber incident could be returned to production. This
would reduce time-in-quarantine, please clients, and
reduce forensic backlogs.

Figure 3. Detecting changes in container / VM contents
As described in the introduction, the process for
creating each visualization is as follows: each byte
from the container file or VM disk is sampled and
run through a one-way privacy-preserving hash
function. Each hashed byte is then mapped to 1 of

256 ASCII color values. Each color value is used to
shade the corresponding pixel in the visualization
PNG file.
Interpretation of the visualizations requires some
degree of contextualization. In many cases it is useful
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to compare container or VM visualizations against
labeled segmentations of other images. This allows
the inspector to identify various segments within the
visualization of interest. For instance, such
comparisons can be made to identify operating
systems, libraries and specific applications. Once a
software component is identified it can be contrasted
against other visualizations of trusted instances of the
same component. Any unexplained differences would
be considered anomalies.
It is predicted that the proposed visualization
method will result in more accurate and timely
identification of container/ VM contents. It is further
expected to result in more accurate and timely
detection of anomalies within identified software
components.

4. Evaluation
A proof-of-concept evaluation was performed to
assess to the efficacy of the proposed new method.
Specifically, the evaluation sought to answer two
questions:
 How fast is the proposed method relative to other
investigative techniques?
 How reliable is the proposed method relative to
other investigative techniques?

4.1. Experimental Groups
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the test
group or the control group. Test group subjects used
the proposed visualization method to analyze
containers and VMs during a simulated cyber event.
The
proposed
visualization
method
was
operationalized for this experiment as a SaaS
platform (see Figure 4).
The platform was custom built for this research
using a combination of python 3 Anaconda libraries
for creating visualizations and JavaScript on the front
end for user interaction. It has modules for comparing
visualizations, identifying software components
within visualizations, and detecting anomalous areas
within known software.
The control group used the contemporary method
to analyze containers and VMs associated with the
same scenario. This group used Kali Linux for brute
force password cracking, data extraction, and
timeline reconstruction.

Figure 4. Forensic analysis using the SaaS
platform

4.2. Participants
A total of 42 individuals assisted in evaluation of
the proposed new methodology. Individuals were
either graduate students who had recently completed
a course on cloud computing, digital forensics, or
operating systems or were recent graduates. To
overcome biases, unfair experience, and any preexisting familiarity with commercial toolsets, only
individuals with no prior professional experience in
digital forensics were included in the study.
Individuals were evenly distributed between the
control group and the test group. Each subject
completed a 45 minute online training session which
described how to use the forensic tool associated with
their group. Subjects then completed a short online
quiz to ensure their familiarity with the toolset.

4.3. Procedure
The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the
relative speed and accuracy of the proposed
visualization method. Each subject was asked to
assess a large number of cloud-based assets during a
limited period of time. As previously indicated, half
of the subjects used the visualization method and half
used traditional techniques.
The analysis includes fingerprinting the software
in the suspicious containers / VMs, identifying
anomalous software, and correctly classifying
individual instances as benign or infected.
Subjects logged into a subset of a private, IaaS
(Infrastructure-as-a-Service) cloud which was
constructed for the purposes of this experiment. Each
subset contained the analytical tool associated with
the subject’s assigned and replications of the same
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container and VM instances. During their analysis,
participants recorded their findings conclusions for
each container or VM instance they analyzed within a
web-based form. The form consisted for 30 sections –
one for each container or VM. There was a space to
record the software inventory and denote the absence
or presence of anomalous code for each instance.

4.4. Means of Comparison
Some 15 Docker containers and 15 ESX-based
VMs were included. The 15 containers were clones
of a single MEAN (mongoDB, express, angular,
node.js) stack web application. The MEAN stack was
chosen because although it is widely used, it is of
sufficient complexity to warrant careful forensic
analysis. The latest stable version of each of the
MEAN stack elements was used in the image. Of the
15 containers 5 were infected with a rootkit which
consists of modified code in the node.js script and a
compressed key string in the angular library (see
Figure 5).
The 15 VMs were clones of a single LAMP
(Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP) stack web
application. The LAMP stack was selected because it
provides a balance between familiarity and
complexity. The Ubuntu 18.04 Linux flavor was
used, along with the latest stable versions of the other
elements. (The study participants all reporting having
at least an introductory level of Linux proficiency.)
The stack was sufficiently large enough to require a
careful investigation. Of the 15 VMs 8 were infected
with a rootkit which modified code within the glibc
library and stored compressed malware in the
MySQL database.
Individuals were scored across two key metrics:
software fingerprinting accuracy and adjudication
accuracy. Fingerprint accuracy is defined as the
correct classification of each software component
within an instance. One point was awarded for
correctly identifying each software component. For
instance, for a container, one point would be awarded
for identifying each MEAN component (and the
node.js code base) for a total of five points per
container.
Similarly, seven points were available for each of
the main components of a LAMP VM. Adjudication
accuracy is the accuracy with which one correctly
classifies a container or VM as benign or infected.
One point is awarded for each correct classification
while a point is deducted for making an incorrect
classification. Overall, a total of 180 software
fingerprinting points and 30 adjudication points were
available for each candidate.

Figure 5. Comparing Container Visualizations

5. Results
Following the completion of the tests, the
demographic data and test results were imputed into a
spreadsheet for further analysis. The demographics
indicate that the subjects skewed towards a younger
age and gender skewed towards male. These data are
illustrated in Table 1 (below). To compare the
performance of the proposed forensic method against
the standard method, a series of T-tests of significant
differences were completed.
The first test compared relative performance at
fingerprinting. The results of this test are shown in
Table 2 (below). The results indicate that the test
group earned significantly more points for
fingerprinting than the control group. This is likely
because once the individuals in the test group learned
to visually recognize specific software components in
the first few visualizations they only needed to
procure visualizations of the other instances to make
quick comparisons. On average, members of the test
group blueprinted 12 containers and 4 VM instances
(for an average of 88 points) while the control group
inspected 5 containers and 1 VM (37 points on
average).
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It appeared that the control group did not suffer in
terms of fingerprinting accuracy. Of the images they
analyzed, their accuracy was either on par or above
the level of the test group. However, they were
limited in their ability to project their acquired
insights across the domain. The traditional approach
is costly in terms of the time consumed acquiring
access credentials for each instance. Further, it does
not provide a single snapshot of the software
contents. This has to be determined manually for
each instance.
A second t-test of significant differences was
conducted to assess adjudication accuracy (see Table
3). This is the extent to which a container or a VM is
correctly classified as containing suspicious software.
Although there were significant differences, the gap
Age
Gender
Ethnicity

18-24
19
Male
27
White
28

25-29
18
Female
15
Black
3

was somewhat less dramatic. The test group earned
an average 12 points while the control group earned 4
points on average.
Members of the test groups did not have to wait
for access the containers or VMs. Hence they were
able to inspect more instances in the same period of
time. On a per-instance basis, it appears that the
accuracy rates are relatively equivalent between
groups. The test and control groups averaged a
classification rate of approximately 68% and 71%,
respectively. Neither approach is conclusively more
accurate than the other.
To sum, the results of the tests indicate that the
proposed visualization method outperforms the
contemporary methods in terms of the speed and
accuracy of software inventorying and adjudication.

30-39
4
Other
0
Hispanic
0

40-49
1

50-59
0

60+
0

Asian
11

Am. Indian
0

Other
0

Table 1. Demographics
Levene’s Test

Equal variance
assumed
Equal variance
not assumed

F

Sig.

9.32

.000

t
4.41

df
40

t-test for Equality of Means
Std.
Sig.
Mean
Err.
(2-tailed)
Diff.
Diff.
.000
51
6

5.01

38.14

.000

51

6

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
49.13
52.87
49.98

53.54

Table 2. t-Test of Significant Differences at Fingerprinting
Levene’s Test

Equal variance
assumed
Equal variance
not assumed

F

Sig.

1.332

.005

t
2.98

df
40

t-test for Equality of Means
Std.
Sig.
Mean
Err.
(2-tailed)
Diff.
Diff.
.005
8
2.01

3.01

38.72

.005

8

2.01

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
7.38
8.62
7.42

8.68

Table 3. t-Test of Significant Differences at Adjudication

6. Implications and future research
The proof-of-concept test described in the
previous sections yields several implications. It
appears that subjects using the visualization method
could adjudicate more VMs and containers than

subjects using traditional methods in the same time
period without a significant increase in errors. During
a massive cloud security incident it would be
beneficial to use the proposed method in order to
reduce backlogs of assets awaiting forensic analysis.

Page 6404

Future research should focus on exploring the
relationship between the granularity of the
visualization, analytical speed, and classification
accuracy. It is expected that down-sampled images
allow for faster analysis although they increase the
likelihood that subtle details will be missed. Further,
future research should focus on automating the
process of software blueprinting. Machine learning
methods such as near-neighbor could be useful for
classifying installed.

7. Conclusions
It is concluded that the proposed method of rapid
incident response could of significant value when
time is of short supply and/or a large quantity of
containers or VMs must be evaluated. An additional
analytical step between automated incident detection
and forensic investigation could save considerable
time and effort if it reduces investigation backlogs.
The proposed method provides an out-of-band
approach to investigating the contents of hosted
instances. It uses a new visualization technique to
display data which might be otherwise difficult to
understand. In this case, the data represents raw bytes
taken from cloud storage. This is a novel viewpoint
which users could not ordinarily access or interpret.
The proof-of-concept tests suggest that the
proposed new step merits additional testing and
development. Using the visualization tools,
Individuals were able to successfully detect malware
approximately 70% of the time. With more research
and development this could rise even higher. Future
combinations of visualizations with more advanced,
intelligent forensics will likely provide even better
results for cloud computer systems.

8. Conclusions
This work is supported in part by the National
Science Foundation award IIP-1740434 and in part
by the Industry Advisory Board of the Center for
Advanced Research in Forensic Science.
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